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HIS was not a particularly fruitful year in the partnership area.
But the Texas Supreme Court did render a decision worthy of
note, which does not happen every Survey period.
II. CASES
A. CAPACITY TO SUE IN TEXAS-WHEN DOES A FOREIGN LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP HAVE CAPACITY TO SUE?-COASTAL LIQUIDS
TRANSPORTATION, L.P. v. HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL DISTRICTF
In Coastal Liquids, the issue was whether a foreign limited partnership
had capacity to sue in Texas.2 Coastal was a Delaware limited partner-
ship that had been doing business in Texas since 1993 but registered as a
foreign limited partnership for the first time on June 27, 1995. 3 Coastal
processed natural gas products from its Harris County facility and used
underground domes to store liquid natural gas and other products. In
1994, the Harris County Appraisal District (the "District") separately
listed and taxed the storage domes as "improvements."'4 The case is about
Coastal's efforts to challenge the District's position.
Although the Court felt that a full discussion of the administrative and
lower court proceedings was important to its decision, a substantially con-
densed version is offered here. Coastal protested the District's appraisals
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
1. 46 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2001).
2. Id. at 882. The dissent, written by Justice Hecht, suggested that the real issue,
which he was dismayed the Court never reached, was whether an underground salt-dome
cavern used to store petroleum products is "land" or an "improvement." The Tax Code
requires that each be appraised separately. Id. at 886.
3. Id. at 882. This proved to be important, because under Section 9.07(a) of the Texas
Revised Limited Partnership Act, a foreign limited partnership (i.e., one organized under
law other than Texas law) may not "maintain an action, suit, or proceeding in Texas until it
has registered in Texas and paid to the secretary of state all amounts owing under Subsec-
tion (d) of this section." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 9.07(a) (Vernon Supp.
2001). But an exception allows a foreign limited partnership to defend an action without
being registered. Id.
4. Coastal Liquids, 46 S.W.3d at 882. Justice Hecht said that "we were told by the
parties and assured by numerous amici curiae [that this] was a legal issue important to
Texas jurisprudence,...." Id. at 886.
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for 1994 and 1995, 5 and pursued the prerequisite administrative avenues
through the Harris County Appraisal Review Board and then appealed
the adverse result to the district court. In a second amended summary
judgment motion, the District invoked Texas Revised Limited Partner-
ship Act ("TRLPA") Section 9.07(a) 6 to support its position that Coastal
lacked capacity to challenge the District's action for either 1994 or 1995
because of the timing of its registration and its statement that it would not
commence business in Texas until July 1, 1995. 7 Without giving a reason,
the district court granted the District's motion for 1994 and Coastal's for
1995; both parties appealed. 8
The court of appeals initially dismissed the case for both 1994 and 1995
because "Coastal failed to show that it had ever properly registered [in
Texas] as a foreign limited partnership."9 Coastal filed a motion for re-
hearing, arguing that applying TRLPA Sec. 9.07(a) to deny it to be heard
would be taking its property without due process and, alternatively, that
the exception in 9.07(a) that permitted defensive actions applied to this
situation. 10 Coastal also sought remand to allow it the opportunity to
show that it had taken the steps necessary to register and pay all required
fees. The court of appeals denied the remand but did agree that Coastal's
action was defensive and, therefore, was within the exception of 9.07(a),
and affirmed the trial court. Again, both parties sought review by the
next court, in this case the Texas Supreme Court."1
The Court discussed the requirements that had to be met by a foreign
limited partnership, which conducted business before it properly regis-
tered, if that partnership wanted to maintain a suit in Texas. TRLPA Sec.
9.07(d) requires payment of both the original registration fee and $750
per year for each year or partial year in which the foreign limited partner-
ship conducted business in Texas without having been registered.' 2 The
Court found that Coastal had not submitted evidence that it had made
any such payment for calendar years 1993 and 1994, in both of which
years it was doing business in Texas. 13 The Court concluded that Coastal
had not done what was necessary to maintain an action for either 1994 or
5. There was considerable stopping and starting to get to this result. First there was
filing for 1994 only; an amended petition included 1995; the District argued that Coastal
could not maintain the action for 1994 because it had not registered in that year; Coastal
responded that it cured that by registering in 1995; the District countered with the argu-
ment that Coastal could not maintain its suit for either year because, when Coastal filed its
application on June 27, 1995, it stated that July 1, 1995, was the first date that it would
conduct business in Texas. Id. at 882-83.
6. See discussion supra note 3.
7. Coastal Liquids, 46 S.W.3d at 883.
8. Id. This made Coastal the appellant for 1994 and the District the appellant for
1995. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 884-85.
11. Coastal Liquids, 46 S.W.3d at 883. In accepting petitions from both parties, the
Court said that when it does so in a summary judgment context, it renders the judgment
that should have been rendered by the trial court. Id. at 884.
12. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 9.07(d) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
13. Coastal Liquids, 46 S.W.3d at 884.
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1995 and that, therefore, TRLPA Sec. 9.07 deprived "Coastal of its au-
thority to sue."' 4 The Court acknowledged that both the Bar Committee
comments on this part of the TRLPA and case law construing the analo-
gous provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act specifically con-
templated that a "post facto" cure of a failed registration could be made,
supporting capacity to maintain a suit after that cure even as to an earlier
point in time. However, Coastal did not carry its burden here by fully
curing the failure and demonstrating that before it got to the Supreme
Court. 15
B. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY OF GENERAL PARTNERS-
HELPINSTILL V. REGIONS BANK
1 6
It is axiomatic that general partners have joint and several liability for
the obligations of a general partnership. 17 It is equally axiomatic that one
should be careful in picking one's partners. Here, one ended up in prison
and the other stuck with liability to a bank.
Helpinstill and Brown were partners in a general partnership, MBO.
They maintained an MBO bank account at Longview National Bank
(predecessor to Regions Bank). 18 Brown ran the business, including
managing the bank account. Over a period of time, Brown engaged in a
consistent practice of overdrawing the account and then later covering
the shortfall with new deposits. It appeared to be cash flow management
of some sort. Even Helpinstill admitted that this was ordinary course of
business activity.19 But Brown eventually extended this to a check-kiting
scheme, 20 which resulted in the account becoming terminally overdrawn.
14. Id. at 885. The Court noted that both parties had approached the issue as one of
standing when the real issue was capacity. The Court said that standing exists when a party
is aggrieved, as Coastal was here, but it found that while standing was necessary, it was not
sufficient, and that a party with standing also must have capacity. Id. at 884.
15. Coastal Liquids, 46 S.W.3d at 885. The Court also noted that Coastal did not chal-
lenge, in the court of appeals, the denial of its motion to demonstrate that it had, in fact,
paid all required fees. Justice Hecht was particularly annoyed by the disposition of the fee
payment issue. First, he noted that the issue was never raised in the trial court, where
Coastal could have then proved that it had already paid, or cured its failure to have done
so. Id. at 887. Nevertheless, that became the dispositive issue in the supreme court. Ad-
ding insult to injury, the Court refused to consider two Coastal arguments because they
were not made in the trial court. Hecht found this double whammy to be "inexplicably
unfair." Id. at 888.
16. 33 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet denied).
17. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.04 (Vernon Supp. 2001) ["TRPA"].
18. Helpinstill, 33 S.W.3d at 403. The court made a statement at this point that con-
fused one critical aspect of this case-the court said that each partner agreed that he would
be individually liable to the bank for any overdrafts on this account. This is important
because the balance of the case suggests that the joint and several liability principle that
nabbed Helpinstill resulted from his status as a general partner; the court's statement (that
the parties agreed to be liable), if meant literally, would produce the result that liability was
a matter of contract, which would have been a much different result.
19. Id. at 404.
20. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 663 (9th ed. 1999) defines a
"kite" to be "a check drawn against uncollected funds in a bank account .... So, when an
unintentional overdraft becomes an intentional scheme to steal money from a bank, a "kit-
ing" scheme has occurred.
2002] 1273
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The bank sued Helpinstill to recover the shortfall of $381,011.15 and ob-
tained a judgment. Helpinstill's principal argument on appeal was that,
when Brown's activity was extended to check-kiting, it ceased to be in the
"ordinary course of business" of MBO. Furthermore, Helpinstill did not
know of Brown's check-kiting and did not ratify that action.2' Too bad.
The court methodically rejected all of Helpinstill's arguments of trial
court error22 and held that Helpinstill was liable as a matter of law be-
cause he was a general partner and the obligation to the bank for the
overdraft was a partnership liability, citing TRPA Section 3.04.23 Al-
though the court did not say so, it clearly was making the policy judgment
that, as between the bank and Helpinstill, the latter was responsible for
the actions of his partner.
C. ELEMENTS OF A JOINT VENTURE-LoSS-SHARING REQUIRED-
SWINEHART V. STUBBEMAN MCRAE, SEALY,
LAUGHLIN & BROWDER, INC. 2 4
This was a legal malpractice case,25 but the relevant issues for this Sur-
vey are not directly related to that. Plaintiff Swinehart was a petroleum
geologist who contracted with Haber Oil, an oil and gas development
company, to provide typical services to help Haber find oil and gas. The
contract entitled Swinehart to a monthly cash payment and to half of the
mineral or royalty interests retained by Haber after it gave up whatever
was necessary to attract investors. Swinehart's efforts were successful
and drilling produced "significant amounts of oil and gas on some of the
leases. ''26 Haber paid Swinehart his retainer and assigned to him an own-
ership interest, but he terminated the relationship before, according to
Swinehart, it had assigned the full interest that Swinehart had earned
under his contracts with Haber.27 Swinehart filed suit.
Swinehart argued that his relationship with Haber went beyond that of
mere parties to a contract; he asserted that they were joint venturers to
support his effort to have the court impose a constructive trust on the
fruits of Haber's development activities. 28 The court explained that a
constructive trust was an equitable remedy designed to prevent unjust
21. Helpinstill, 33 S.W.3d at 404.
22. For example, the Court easily found that Brown's act of creating overdrafts was in
the ordinary course of MBO's business and benefited MBO (even when it triggered
Helpinstill's liability), even though it acknowledged that the business did not include the
check-kiting scheme. Id.
23. Helpinstill, 33 S.W.3d at 404.
24. 48 S.W. 3d 865 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
25. Id. at 873. Swinehart was unhappy with the handling of a state court suit and
related bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court found in Swinehart's favor, and the federal
district court upheld those findings. But the Fifth Circuit essentially said that Swinehart
failed to do many necessary things in his legal proceedings to support his position, and it
reversed. The parties settled for much less than Swinehart had been awarded by the lower
courts. Id. at 872-73.
26. Id. at 871.
27. Id.
28. Swinehart, 48 S.W.3d at 878.
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enrichment and that it can be based on a fiduciary relationship, such as
one that exists as a matter of law between partners or joint venturers. 29
The court analyzed Swinehart's joint venture argument under the long-
standing four element test applied by Texas courts, which have held that
there must be present in the relationship: "(i) a community of interest,
(ii) an agreement to share profits, (iii) an agreement to share losses, and
(iv) a mutual right of control or management. '30 The court found no
evidence to support an agreement of the parties to share losses; therefore,
there was no basis to find a joint venture. 31
III. LEGISLATION
The Survey period included a legislative session. Not much happened
in the partnership or limited liability company area, but there were a few
notable changes.
A. TEXAS REVISED LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT.
Senate Bill 132032 effected a few changes in the TRLPA, a couple of
which are worth mentioning. Section 1.06 was revised to eliminate the
requirement that, on change of a registered office, a particular required
statement be verified. It is no longer required to be verified, only
signed. 33 More importantly, Section 6.01(b) of the TRPA, which defines
the events of withdrawal of a partner, was revised to add a new subpara-
graph (11) to provide that withdrawal occurs on the conversion of the
partnership into a different form (e.g., limited liability company, corpora-
tion), if the partner did not consent to the conversion and did not notify
the partnership in writing of the partner's desire not to withdraw within
60 days after the later of the effective date of the conversion or the date
the partner receives actual notice of the conversion. 34 In addition, a com-
plementary new subsection (c) was added to Section 6.01, providing that
a withdrawal of a partner on a conversion is effective immediately before
the effective date of the conversion and is not considered to be a wrong-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 879 (citing Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex.
1981) (emphasis added)). The loss-sharing element is a unique, common law element,
which Texas courts have limited to joint ventures.
31. Swinehart, 48 S.W.3d at 879. The court also declined to find an informal confiden-
tial relationship, which also could have supported the imposition of a constructive trust. Id.
at 882. Interestingly, TRPA § 2.02(a) defines a "partnership" to be an "an association of
two or more persons to carry on a business for profit as owners .... whether the persons
intend to create a partnership and whether the association is called a 'partnership,' 'joint
venture,' or other name." TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.04, § 2.02(a) (Vernon
2001) (emphasis added). The 1993 Bar Committee comment states: "The subsection also
explicitly includes a joint venture that satisfies the definition of 'partnership' as a partner-
ship subject to TRPA. This codifies existing case law." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b-3.04, § 2.02(a) cmt. (Vernon Supp. 2001). Somehow, retaining the peculiar Texas
common law requirement that "loss-sharing" be found seems to fly in the face of this.
32. Act of Sept. 1, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 757, 2001 Gen. Sess. Laws 1481.
33. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 1.06(i) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
34. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 6.01(b)(11) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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ful withdrawal. 35 These changes are intended to protect a partner from
an involuntary change in status, for example, to a corporate shareholder,
which could have adverse tax or other consequences.
B. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES.
One notable change to the Texas Limited Liability Company Act 36 was
made, requiring that limited liability companies that are dissolving, or
foreign limited liability companies that are withdrawing from conducting
business in Texas, provide to the secretary of state a certificate from the
comptroller of public accounts that all taxes, not just franchise taxes
(which was the requirement before amendment), including all penalties
and interest, that are administered by the comptroller under Title 2, Tax
Code, have been paid.37
35. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 6.01(c) (Vernon Supp. 2001). Presuma-
bly, these results may be varied by agreement of the partners, under the authority of TRPA
Section 1.03(a), with the possible limitation that the conversion action and result provided
for under the partnership agreement is found not to have violated the obligation of good
faith under TRPA Section 4.04(d), which under Section 1.03(b), cannot be eliminated, al-
though it may be defined.
36. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (Vernon Supp. 2001).
37. The amendment relating to dissolution is to Article 6.08 and to withdrawal is to
Article 7.10.
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